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THE CONSENSUAL POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT: A 
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Criticism and contestation of large dam projects have a long, strong history in India. In 
this paper, we analyze diverse civil-society responses to large dam projects in the Eastern 
Himalaya region of India, which has in the past decades been presented as a clean, green, 
climate-mitigating way of generating energy, but critiqued for its adverse impacts more 
recently. We draw our findings primarily based on interviews with NGOs involved in 
environmental and/or water issues in Darjeeling, interviews with those involved in a local 
people’s movement ‘Affected Citizens of Teesta’, and participatory research over the course 
of three years between 2015 and 2018. Our findings show how doing development for 
the state, the market and/or donor organizations compromises the ability of NGOs in the 
Darjeeling region to hold these actors accountable for social and environmental excesses. 
In the same region, dam projects in North Sikkim led to a local people’s movement, where 
expressions of indigeneity, identity and place were used to critique and contest the State’s 
agenda of development, in ways that were symptomatically different to NGOs tied down 
by relations of developmental bureaucracy. Our findings reveal how the incursion of State 
authority, presence and power in civil-society undermines the civil society mandate of 
transformative social change, and additionally, how the geographical, political, institutional 
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Criticism and contestation of large dam projects have a long, strong history in India. In 
this paper, we analyze diverse civil-society responses to large dam projects in the Eastern 
Himalaya region of India, which has in the past decades been presented as a clean, 
green, climate-mitigating way of generating energy, but critiqu d for its adverse impacts
more recently. We draw our findings primarily based on interviews with NGOs involved 
in environmental and/or water issues in Darjeeling, interviews with those involved in a 
local people’s movement ‘Affected Citizens of Teesta’, and participatory research over the 
course of three years between 2015 and 2018. Our findings show how doing development 
for the state, the market and/or donor organizations compromises the ability of NGOs 
in the Darjeeling region to hold these actors accountable for social and environmental 
excesses. In the same region, dam projects in North Sikkim l d to a local people’s
movement, where expressions of indigeneity, identity and place were used to critique and 
contest the State’s agenda of development, in ways that were symptomatically different 
to NGOs tied down by relations of developmental bureaucracy. Our findings reveal how 
the incursion of State authority, presence and power in civil-society undermines the civil 
society mandate of transformative social change, and additionally, how the geographical, 
political, institutional and identity-based divides that fragment diverse civil-society 
institutions and a tors make it challenging to co t  the increasing y consensual politics
of environmental governance.
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and identity-based divides that fragment diverse civil-society institutions and actors make 
it challenging to counter the increasingly consensual politics of environmental governance. 
INTRODUCTION
‘NGOs [Non-governmental organizations] 
are essential for extended work of 
governments, as feedback and as harbingers 
of change, and are vital for economic and 
social systems to thrive… (however) a 
significant number of Indian NGOs (funded 
by some donors based in US, UK, Germany 
and Netherlands) have been noticed to 
be using people-centric issues to create 
an environment stalling development 
projects…This strategy serves its purpose 
when funded Indian NGOs’ reports are used 
to internationalize and publicize alleged 
violations in international fora. All the above 
is used to build a record against a country 
or an individual, in order to keep the entity 
under pressure and in a state of under-
development’.
The above text is from a supposedly 
classified “secret” internal document 
of the Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of 
Home, Government of India (GoI) (for 
further details, see Sarma, 2014), which is 
nonetheless available to download online. 
While the document’s authenticity and/
or authorship cannot be validated, it does 
speak of the current situation; of constraints 
and political coercions in questioning state-
led development, in the case we discuss in 
this paper in the context of hydropower 
development projects in the North-Eastern 
Himalayan region. 
A renewed interest in hydropower 
development in an energy-surplus India 
(Goyal, 2017; Upadhyay and Singh, 2017) 
is influenced by both global and national 
drivers. Internationally, policy narratives 
reposition hydropower development as 
clean energy, as climate mitigating. In India, 
financial reports stress the importance 
of hydropower in enabling economic 
growth as well as achieving sustainable 
development targets (FICCI-PwC, 2014). In 
this context, the Eastern Himalayas region 
has also been the target of ambitious 
hydropower development plans. However, 
hydropower development here has been 
rife with controversies: how the proposed 
climate gains (as opposed to ‘traditional’ 
energy sources) from large hydropower 
development intersect with local climate-
change impacts; if projected outcomes of 
economic gains and energy security from 
hydropower development will be fully 
achieved; and how costs, benefits and risks 
be distributed among diverse stakeholders, 
including project-affected local communities 
(Dharmadhikary, 2008; Pomeranz, 2009). 
There are several studies which critique 
the manner in which large dams have 
been planned, approved, financed and 
implemented in the North Eastern region of 
India (Ahlers et. al., 2015). This is, however, 
not the focus of this paper. Here, we look 
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missing (Joshi, 2015), although precisely 
therefore they should re-emerge. Our 
research does not negate NGOs’ potential 
as a third pillar next to the market and the 
State, but rather illuminates the need for 
revisioning their political potential. 
As t ings st , NGOs in Darj eli g operate 
in a context where political power operates 
rationally through rather than for civil 
society (Se ding an  Newmann, 2006). 
In general, NGOs embroiled in doing 
d velopment ar  both object and subject 
of the state (S ding and Newmann 2006; 
Bryant, 2002; Rose et al., 2006; Rose and 
Miller, 1992). NGOs in the Darj eling 
region can do littl  else b t collaborate in 
this web of governance, legitimizing this 
governmentality. The absence of a functional 
democracy in Darjeeling impacts th  lack of 
civil society in D rjeeling and this vicious 
cycle persists. In such a skewed political 
terrain, hydropower development or any 
other form of trans-local coercion requires 
no more than a façade of participation. What 
we researched and discussed in Darjeeling 
mirrors the nature and circumstances in 
which hydropower projects are being rolled 
out in seemingly contentious regions around 
the world: elsewhere in India’s North-East, 
but also in the neighboring Mekong Basin. 
In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(Lao PDR), the rush to develop hydropower 
happens where historically there has been 
no culture of participation (Grumbine 
and Xu, 2011; Matthews and Dotta, 2015; 
Goldman, 2001); where civil society is 
either absent, h avily restricted and/or 
cri inalized (Matthews and Schmidt, 2014). 
To co clude, challenging the consensual 
politics of eco-governmentality requires  
greater solidarity betwee  different civil 
society a tors and agencies - but this is 
easi  said than done. What remains of 
a dammed Teesta riv  flows far beyond 
the divided administrative borders of the 
States of Sikkim and We t Bengal - well into 
Bangladesh. And yet, even betw en Sikkim 
and Darjeeling in West Bengal, politico-
administrative arrangements, ethnic-
fractures and local politics continue to 
divide, rath r than unite, local communitie  
an  civil society. However, as our findings 
note, g vernanc  is on the ‘move’ in that 
elationships betwe n the S ate and civil 
socie y are not tatic nor predict ble. It is 
this fluidity that we identify as a potentially 
attractive space for diverse co litions to 
emerge among different civil s ciety groups 
and actors to take better control of public 
life.
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at how local civil society has responded to 
these developments. It is argued that civil 
society’s function is to critically engage 
with State hierarchies to ‘keep the State 
accountable and effective’ (Lewis, 2002, 
p.571); to enable ‘citizen control of public 
life’ (Cox, 1999, p.27). India, in particular, 
has been applauded for its rich history of 
civil social movements, strongly oriented 
towards environmental wrongs and rights. 
This history of India’s vibrant civil society 
can be traced to its colonial past, where 
civil-society actors and institutions held the 
colonial State accountable, challenged its 
undemocratic processes and effected social 
and political change – to this day (Omvedt, 
1994; Berglund, 2009). As formal civil 
society organizations, NGOs have played 
key roles in environmental struggles post-
colonially, and as Nayak (2010, p.71) writes, 
civil-society’s ‘struggle[s] against big dams 
[are a] … prominent phenomena in India’s 
sociocultural and political picture’.
The term civil society itself includes a range 
of formal and informal organizations – 
community-based groups, social welfare 
organizations, social-action groups and 
movements, as well as academic, activist 
coalitions – organized around and engaged 
in various issues, of which “environmental” 
concerns have been a particularly common 
rallying point (Omvedt, 1993). For the 
purpose of this paper, we conceptualize 
NGOs as CSOs that take on a formal legal 
structure. In India, all NGOs are registered 
under the colonially-instituted (1860) 
Societies Registration Act. This Act, which is 
now regarded as an Act of Parliament, allows 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government 
of India to monitor and regulate the 
functioning of NGOs. Only selected NGOs 
with additional official approval are eligible 
to receive and use foreign funds. The 
Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) 
was instituted by the Government of India 
(GoI) during the 1975 Emergency rule, to 
[further] regulate NGO functioning. This 
legislation has since continued. 
Using the framework of analyzing CSOs 
operating inside and outside the politico-
jurisdiction of State authority and outreach, 
we compare how people’s movements 
un-shackled from development funding 
and regulation have responded to 
hydropower development vis-à-vis how 
formal, institutionalized NGOs based in 
Darjeeling responded to hydropower 
development in the region. Our research 
findings point to an increasing incursion 
of State authority, presence and power in 
civil society functioning and operation. This 
phenomenon is neither new or unusual. 
Foucault (1979) has written extensively 
of the intertwine of the State and civil 
society, particularly in neoliberal framings 
of economic growth, development, new 
[neoliberal] freedoms and spaces. In this 
context, Mohan (2002) describes how 
the co-option of the civil society by the 
State, by donors and other developmental 
actors has been a deliberate agenda. 
These observations lead one to question 
why there is still great faith levied on ‘civil 
society to champion both democracy as well 
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as development’ (Hammett and Jackson, 
2017; p.1), particularly, as civil society 
organizations seem to be increasingly 
‘deployed… by the developmental state 
model… to constrain (and contain) critical 
interventions and enactments of citizenship 
and civil society’ (Gough and Shackley, 2001, 
p.332). 
Against that background, our research 
analyzed diverse civil society organizations 
and their nature of engagement with dam 
development in the Eastern Himalaya 
regions of Sikkim and Darjeeling. In the 
following section an elaboration is given on 
framework within which and through which 
NGOs operate. Subsequently, a section is 
dedicated to the research methodology and 
a background of the regions in which the case 
studies took place. The paper then moves 
to the presentation of the research findings, 
in which the case studies of Darjeeling and 
Sikkim are addressed separately. The paper 
ends with a conclusion on the findings in 
which the wider implications of our research 
are also discussed. 
THE FRAMEWORK OF CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND CLIMATE 
MITIGATING POLICIES
It is important to note that the recent 
surge of hydropower development, 
that has developed in the policies to 
control climate change, has furthered the 
consensus between the State, market and 
a selected science community (Goldman, 
2001; Swyngedouw, 2009; Gough and 
Shackley, 2001). Swyngedouw (2011; 3,4) 
points that this nature of consensus in 
climate related politics does highlight an 
imminent environmental challenge; but in 
the process of making the risks of climate 
change visible, complex ground realities 
are depoliticized through ‘one quilted… 
invocation(s) of fear and danger’ which 
mask different socio-ecological, -economic 
and -political contexts… to ‘a universal 
singular… commodity fetishism around 
CO2’. The challenges of climate change on 
the one hand, and the depoliticization of 
the complexity of climate change on the 
other, makes critique and/or contestation 
of climate problems and solutions difficult. 
In fact, as we noted in the introductory 
citation, any critique of such development 
is easily labeled in India (and elsewhere) as 
anti-national and anti-development (Sarma, 
2014). 
In principle, hydropower development does 
allow combining principles of sustainability, 
development and economic growth, 
but several actors contest the “truth” 
of such win-win equations. Firstly, it is 
unclear how the global climate impacts of 
clean energy intersect with social and 
environmental impacts experienced 
locally in the development of hydropower. 
More specifically, several studies (e.g. 
Dharmadhikary, 2008; Pomeranz, 2009) 
questioning the attributed positive outcomes 
of hydropower development in the climate-
vulnerable Himalayan regions symbolize 
these controversies. Secondly, it is not clear 
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if it is environmental or economic mandates 
that drive hydropower development. In 
India, the importance of hydropower to 
economic growth seems to take precedence 
over the supposed environmental gains 
from clean energy development (FICCI-
PwC, 2014). Nonetheless, the efficiency 
and distributional implications of large 
dams are also questionable. Duflo and 
Pande (2007, p.1) note that, ‘Overall… large 
dam construction in India is a marginally 
cost-effective investment with significant 
distributional implications, and has, in 
aggregate, increased poverty’. Goldman 
(2001, p.205) speaks of how the “green neo-
liberal project” of climate change brought 
together ‘neocolonial conservationist 
ideas of enclosure and preservation and 
neoliberal notions of market value and 
optimal resource allocation’. Transnational 
financial and developmental institutions 
have helped construct this argument, which 
in writing does help combine principles of 
sustainability, development and economic 
growth. Mitigating climate change is a 
contentious issue and is considered by some 
as ‘the collective action problem of our era’ 
(Brechin, 2016, p.846). This helps explain 
why consensus is so strategic for climate 
change interventions and strategies, even 
when evidence from the ground points to 
contradictory outcomes of overtly simplistic 
climate solutions. 
Against that background, Gough and 
Shackley (2001, p.340) provide a fascinating 
look at how select NGOs have joined ‘the 
IPCC/Kyoto Protocol global community’, 
which according to the authors is 
significantly and increasingly ‘influence(d) 
by powerful actors from the private sector’. 
This has resulted in a reversal of the roles of 
NGOs, ‘from that of outside critical agents 
demanding issue recognition and action (on 
environmental issues) to that of partners 
in developing workable frameworks and 
principles… promoting the solution to the 
problem… that anthropogenic climate 
change is a significant risk that has to be 
managed, and urgently’. The authors (ibid, 
p.329) argue how ‘a place (for NGOs) at the 
(global) negotiating table certainly makes 
climate politics respectable but weakens 
the ‘constitutional legitimacy’ of these 
NGOs’. Indeed, it is NGOs ‘outside the 
climate change epistemic community’ who 
have raised ‘ethical and political questions’, 
for example by challenging the “statistical 
valuation of l ife” by environmental 
economists to calculate the costs of climate 
change impacts in different regions of the 
world’ (ibid, p.332). Ironically, NGOs who 
were part of the global climate coalition, 
saw such critique as delaying the release 
of important climate documentation (ibid). 
In that regard, it is interesting to note that 
a critiquing, thinking, re-politicizing civil 
society has long been diluted by what 
Ferguson (1994) termed the “anti-politics of 
development”. Giles Mohan (2002) speaks 
about how development de-politicizes 
NGOs by funding them for pre-determined 
development activities, i.e., for doing 
development. The neoliberal development 
framework channels funds to Southern 
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NGOs, ‘because NGOs are seen as more 
efficient than corrupt states in delivering 
local social services’ (ibid, p.128); and the few 
donors who see NGOs roles in enabling and/
or enhancing transparency in governance, 
reach out mostly to reliable, ‘urban-based, 
professional, elite, advocacy NGOs’, who 
‘concentrate on networking and encouraging 
public debate through [exclusionary] 
seminars and workshops’. The ideological 
visioning of an inclusive, transformative civil 
society is thus an increasingly “imagined” 
notion. Nonetheless, not all state-imposed 
plans for development plans are rolled 
out uncontested and not all civil society 
organizations are politically diluted. There 
are ‘ordinary’ citizens advancing alternatives 
to dominant ideas, challenging elite 
assumptions and norms in ways that were 
envisioned by Gramsci (1971), which we will 
discuss further in the section on the Affected 
Citizens of Teesta (ACT). Before doing so, 
the following section briefly describes the 
research methodology of the research, and 
regions in which the research took place.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
AND REGIONAL BACKGROUND
This paper analyzes the engagement and 
response of two different civil society 
organizations to hydropower developments 
along the Teesta River, which flows from 
Sikkim through the Darjeeling region in 
the Eastern Himalayas and onwards into 
Bangladesh. The findings presented in this 
paper reflect over three years of interaction 
starting in 2015 with multiple NGOs and 
activists in the region through numerous 
meetings, workshops, formal and informal 
discussions. Additionally, the paper draws 
on two students' M.A. thesis research in 
2015, which respectively analyzed NGOs in 
the Darjeeling region, and the Lepcha tribal 
movement, affected citizens of Teesta. 
The Darjeeling district of West Bengal is 
in North-Eastern India and is located just 
South to the Himalayan State of Sikkim. 
The Darjeeling region boasts India’s first 
hydropower projects – in Sindrebong 
in 1919 (Chattarjee, 1979, p.74). Post-
independence, several other small projects 
were implemented here by the West 
Bengal State Electricity Board. The projects 
discussed in this paper involve more recent 
larger developments, particularly the Teesta 
Low Dam Projects III & IV (see Map 2). 
These two dams were commissioned in 
2016, while three other projects, Rammam 
Stage I, III, and IV, are in various stages of 
completion. 
From June to August 2015, we interviewed 
30 NGOs in the Darjeeling region involved 
in environmental and/or water issues, 
to assess their engagement in the Teesta 
Stage III and IV projects, to understand 
how and why these NGOs were established, 
how they operate and on what issues, 
eventually focusing the discussions on their 
engagement with the Teesta Lower Dam 
projects. These interviews were deliberately 
semi-structured. In addition, because the 
Darjeeling region has been embroiled for 
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over four decades in a political struggle 
for a separate State, Gorkhaland - which 
deeply impacts the local context, we tried 
to understand the institutional structure 
and culture in which NGOs operate, the 
challenges and risks faced by staff members 
in their day-to-day work and how this 
impacts what they choose to do (or not). 
The State of Sikkim lies directly across the 
border from Darjeeling district in West 
Bengal (see Map 1). A second thesis study 
was started here and then continued 
Map 1: Darjeeling region of West Bengal
New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 5 (1), 2019
818 
New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 5(1), December 2018
in the Darjeeling region to analyze how 
the ACT movement against hydropower 
development in Dzongu in North Sikkim 
was defined by notions, experiences 
and expressions of Lepcha identity and 
indigeneity. Lepchas are considered to be 
the indigenous inhabitants of the entire 
Eastern Himalaya region, which includes 
western Bhutan, eastern Nepal, Tibet, 
Sikkim and the Darjeeling district, an area 
the Lepchas called Mayel Lyang (“hidden 
paradise”).  What remains of Mayel Lyang 
is now Dzongu in North Sikkim. The last 
monarch of Sikkim, himself a 
Bhutia (migrant from Tibet) 
declared Dzongu as a Lepcha 
reserve in 1956 (see Map 2), 
restricting access to, and land 
ownership in this region, for all, 
including non-Lepcha Sikkimese 
citizens. This ecological and 
cultural preservation of Dzongu 
was  made constitutional ly 
non-negotiable  in  S ikk im’s 
amalgamation with India in 1975, 
which explains Dzongu’s cultural 
and ethno-political significance 
for all Lepchas. 
This also explains why the ACT 
movement against large dams 
planned in the Dzongu region 
was widely supported by Lepchas 
living outside Dzongu, as well 
as outside Sikkim. A 41-year-old 
Lepcha male farmer in Kalimpong 
in West Bengal had actively 
protested against the dams. For 
him, “Dzongu is the land of all Lepchas” 
(Field research, 2015). Likewise, a young 
male respondent in Dzongu said, “It doesn’t 
mean that Darjeeling, Kalimpong Lepchas 
are different. We all are the same. We all 
offer prayer to the deities in Dzongu. When 
Dzongu is affected, all Lepchas are affected” 
(Field research, 2015). In analysing the ACT 
movement, all interviewees but two were 
Lepchas. In all, 24 interviews were conducted 
with individuals in Dzongu, the State capital 
of Gangtok in Sikkim, and in Darjeeling 
and Kalimpong towns in West Bengal. The 
Map 2: Locating Dzongu
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youngest interviewee was 19, and the oldest 
80. As with the NGOs, interviews were 
semi-structured. In addition, 53 quantitative 
surveys asked open- and closed-ended 
questions of participants who had not 
been interviewed. In the entire research 
process, communication in English with 
the respondents (NGO staff and Lepcha 
individuals) was possible and a translator 
was needed in only 2-3 cases (Lepcha 
interviewees). 
Taking note of Mohan’s (2002; p.129) 
concern that ‘NGOs… are under increasing 
criticism and scrutiny from academics and 
policy practitioners’, we add that, the findings 
discussed here are not a one-off exploration 
of complex ground realities; rather, the data 
presented includes layered communication 
over time and space. Nonetheless, we 
acknowledge a research project’s limitations 
to unravel complex socio-political histories 
and acknowledge how “outsider” research-
focused perspectives often sit uncomfortably 
with complex local realities - various 
challenges, coercions and compulsions, 
spatial heterogeneities, social networks, 
local calamities, etc. that impact what 
NGOs and activists do locally. Our findings 
try and portray, analyze, and interpret 
the situation’s uniqueness, complexity 
and situatedness, giving a ‘sense of being 
there’ (Cohen et al., 2011, p.129). Below 
we discuss the case study of Darjeeling, 
after which we present the case study of 
Sikkim’s ACT. 
NGO RESPONSES TO 
HYDROPOWER IN DARJEELING
From the NGOs response during the time 
of the interviews in 2015 an evident shift 
in focus can be derived when it came 
to response to the implementation of 
hydropower development project. With 
the exception of one respondent, all NGOs 
indicated to not (anymore) be involved 
in resistance against hydropower, even 
though they had done so or considered 
doing so in the recent past. The intriguing 
silence surrounding the dams requires an 
understanding of the functioning of these 
NGOs: how they are established, how they 
are regulated, how they are operated, etc. 
It is the answer to these questions which 
we discuss below, and which make for a 
compelling contrast with Sikkim’s ACT. 
The political playing field of NGOs 
in Darjeeling
Administratively, the region of Darjeeling 
is governed as the Gorkha Territorial 
Administration (GTA) under the State of 
West Bengal. However, this arrangement 
is not a preferred local option. As recently 
as September 2017, the GTA region closed 
down for three months (104 days), during 
which time there was a violent conflict for 
political separation from the state of West 
Bengal. This resulted in three reported 
deaths and the closing of all offices, shops, 
schools, traffic, banks and other commercial 
institutions for over 3 months. The area had 
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been cordoned physically by State security 
forces, and the State Government blocked 
the internet. This was yet another failed 
attempt in the now four-decade struggle 
with the State of West Bengal to secure a 
separate state of Gorkhaland.
It is against this political background 
- which creates a minefield of socio-
political, and economic challenges around 
environmental governance - in which civil 
society can and should intervene. But 
no NGO in the Darjeeling region queries 
political-environmental coercions. NGOs in 
Darjeeling, like elsewhere in the Himalayas, 
mostly work on technical environmental 
issues, including donor-driven agendas 
against deforestation, landslides, water-
supply scarcity and in favor of biodiversity 
conservation; where predetermined 
developmental solutions match typically 
apolitical framings of complex socio-
environmental problems (Yates, 2012). 
In fact, most NGOs in the Darjeeling region 
were created to address constructed 
environmental problems. A few NGO 
question the framing of preconstructed 
environmental problems by speaking 
of politics and power in environmental 
governance,  but  these  v iews  are 
conveniently circumscribed to local political 
interests: “What is needed is to completely 
remove the West Bengal government [the 
forest department] which is interested 
only in profiting from our forests” (Field 
data, 2015). However, such views are 
expressed with an immediate request for 
anonymity. After all, it is explained - ‘politics 
is the work of politicians’ (ibid). NGOs 
here, they explain, do development - they 
implement conservation, afforestation, 
water-harvesting programs and projects 
and are careful to avoid using their work 
and data to challenge contentious political 
issues. For example, a local NGO we met 
shared data which shows how hydropower 
projects accelerate landslides in this fragile 
ecology, but they are constrained to use this 
evidence to contest large dams. According 
to them, their role is to “inform citizens 
and authorities about precautionary 
measures that can reduce human impact 
on landslides” (Field data, 2015). Another 
critical issue in the Darjeeling hills is acute 
drinking/domestic water scarcity. NGOs 
working on water-supply issues understand 
water problems as a technical/management 
issue; they work to improve local, traditional 
water resources management, but decline 
to ‘critically engage with the politics behind 
the enduring water-supply injustice’ (Joshi, 
2015, p.117). 
Darjeeling NGOs’ involvement in 
the hydropower implementation 
process
Despite being aware of the impacts of 
large-scale hydropower development 
in the region and the coercions in such 
development, NGOs in Darjeeling currently 
refrain from questioning them. NGO staff 
point out the futility of political critique 
vis-à-vis the need to resolve basic problems: 
“rather than spend my energy trying to 
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fight the government, it is much better 
to do something more profitable (sic)… 
To work with the community, make a 
documentary… doing something that is in 
their [the community] interest” (Field data, 
2015). Nonetheless, it is evident that their 
funding pushes them to “do development” 
and also prohibits the criticism of ongoing 
official interventions. 
Very few NGOs in the Darjeeling region 
receive foreign funding. Most receive project-
specific funds from the Central Government 
for activities such as organic farming, 
environmental awareness campaigns, 
forest floriculture activities, sanitation, etc. 
(Field data, 2015). The few with a Foreign 
Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) approval 
do similar development work for donors 
such as the Japanese (JICA) for safe drinking 
water; USAID for community forestry work; 
the European Commission for smallholder 
innovation for climate-change resilient food 
security, etc. NGOs here are careful with 
their FCRA-holding status, prudent not to 
lose it through involvement in activities 
that may be viewed as too political. This 
is not surprising: FCRA-holding NGOs 
in North-East India have been regularly 
“blacklisted” by government authorities 
for raising environmental concerns that are 
considered politically incorrect (Bhaumik, 
2003 in McDuie-Ra 2008, p.195). In June 
2017, the Indian Express, a leading national 
daily, reported that, ‘Since the [current] NDA 
government came to power [in India], the 
FCRA licenses of more than 11,000 NGOs 
have been cancelled. More than 1,300 were 
refused renewal of their license for violating 
the FCRA’. Some sources quote a higher 
number of FCRA cancellations: 20,000. The 
importance of holding an FCRA approval is 
further highlighted by the below excerpt 
of an interview with an NGO worker in the 
Darjeeling region (Field data, 2015). 
Respondent: “Luckily, as an organization 
we joined (sic) the FCRA in 1996; we 
had a couple of good people who 
supported us; we had our papers [in 
order]: society’s registration, income 
tax registration forms, etc. We are one 
of the few lucky ones who have the 
registration and we’ve been careful to 
ensure continued approval of our FCRA. 
It’s not easy, but we have our papers up 
to date and we’ve kept it clean and clear. 
We have continued our registration since 
the early 2000s, so almost fifteen years”.  
Researcher: And you say you were lucky 
to get it? 
Respondent: “Yeah, lucky enough in 
the sense, because I think it got tighter 
and tighter… the newer rules. There 
has been a lot of control. And because 
we are a border State with Nepal, the 
Maoist movement… more and more 
FCRAs are restricted here. So, we were 
lucky to get it”.  
Project-driven development prevents 
‘facilitating transformative development’ 
(Banks et al. 2015, p.708) and requires 
Respondent: “Luckily, as an 
organization we joined (sic) the 
FCRA in 1996; we had a couple of 
good people ho supported us; we 
had our papers [in order]: society’s 
registration, inc e tax registration 
forms, etc. We are one of the few 
lucky ones who have the registration 
and we’ve b en carefu to ensure 
co tinued approval of our FCRA. It’s 
not sy, but we have our papers 
up to date and we’ve kept it clea  
and clear. We have continued our 
registration since the early 2000s, 
so almost fifteen years”.
Researcher: And you say you were 
lucky to get it?
Respondent: “Yeah, lucky enough 
in the sense, because I think it got 
tighter and tighter… the newer rules. 
There has been a lot of control. And 
because we are a border State with 
Nepal, the Maoist movement… 
more and more FCRAs are restricted 
here. So, we were lucky to get it”.
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(project-oriented) NGOs to be accountable 
primarily to donors and to other regulatory 
authorities. But there is huge clamor for 
such funding, which tends to make NGOs 
competitive and territorial, while similarly 
eroding solidarity on issues of wider political 
concern. As a respondent summarized, “If I 
am working with street children, that’s all. If 
I’m working with deaf and dumb, that’s all. 
If I’m working with the blind, that’s it. Each 
one who has their own NGOs… if I’m doing 
sanitation I’m bothered about my toilets 
and what have you” (Field data, 2015). This 
is not to say that NGOs in Darjeeling are 
not aware of these limitations and/or do 
not collaborate: there are NGO platforms, 
and collaboration does happen, but such 
meetings are managerial, rather than as 
political strategy to consolidate and claim 
political spaces in which to voice political 
concerns. One government-funded NGO 
summed it up: “Ours is an organization that 
came up without too much financial support, 
I should say. We rely largely on support 
directly from the Government. Somewhere 
around 1998 or 1999, it started dawning 
on us that this was not going anywhere 
because this is too small; we are not even 
able to create local influence, we have no 
power, really. We don’t have any fund, we 
don’t have any resources. Our actions are 
being guided by the ground rules set by the 
Government officials. We are evading the 
real issues [referring to the political issues 
in the region]” (Field data, 2015). With no 
financial support, they struggle to sustain 
their work, let alone effect change: “There 
are many problems, but you need money to 
fight. We could file a case in the court, but 
for that you need to pay a lawyer. Without 
lawyers, we couldn’t file a case” (Field data, 
2015). 
Doing development disallows 
dissent
A few NGOs we met had protested the 
TLDP III & IV projects in their early planning 
stages without any (international) funding. 
Concerns about environmental impacts 
( irreversible river-ecology changes, 
increased landsl ide frequency and 
magnitude, unpredictable groundwater 
sh ifts  around dam locations  f rom 
construction work, use of heavy vehicles, 
excavations, tunneling, etc.) led these 
NGOs to protest. Additionally, while official 
regulation promises inclusive, consultative 
decision-making processes, these NGOs 
noticed “the lack of transparency, lack of 
people’s participation in the process” (Field 
data, 2015). The respondents explained 
how Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) documents were not made public or 
only EIA summaries made available (and 
not in the local language) at locations 
distant from project affected regions. The 
NGOs observed consensual arrangements 
between hydropower developers, State 
and central government authorities and 
University faculty undertaking the EIA 
studies. They also noted how compensation 
was arbitrarily set for project-affected 
communities and/or promises made to lure 
local communities to approve the projects. 
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“They told farmers in one village that a 
watershed project would be implemented, 
this was never followed through” (Field 
data, 2015). In another village (Suruk), 
(developers) promised a bridge, a school, 
electricity connections – nothing was 
provided” (Field data, 2015). The new 
agenda of Corporate Social Responsibility 
requiring hydropower companies to invest 
a share of their investments in socially-
relevant initiatives, was used, “to privilege 
local elite (politicians, contractors) with 
contracts to construct roads, bridges, 
community centers, what have you” and 
build on the patronage to enable companies 
to implement their projects “smoothly” 
without any objections (Field data, 2015) 
(see also the below interview excerpt from 
the 2015 field data). 
Interviewer: “So when you became a 
political representative, the process [of 
building hydropower dams] was already 
ongoing?” 
Respondent: “… actually what happened, 
you know, 51 households were having 
interviews [on compensation] – okay. But 
they were not getting the [promised] jobs 
and/or the [promised] compensation”.  
Interviewer: “They didn’t receive it”? 
Respondent: “Yeah, but we fought it 
with the Rammam hydro-project, and we 
stopped [power] generation for almost 
two months”. 
Interviewer: “How did you do that”? 
Respondent: “All together, we went 
to the intake, blocked water flow, and 
gave a letter to the project manager. 
Because they are not issuing checks to 
the project-affected, so we are doing 
this. We blocked the intake for two 
months and one day their manager 
came to our political office and agreed 
to provide eight lakhs [800,000 rupees] 
per household... So, we allowed them 
[the project-affected people] to earn that 
(sic) [benefit]. It means… how much… 
almost four crores [four million rupees]. 
And they also gave us [local political 
representatives] three crores (three 
million) for surrounding developments; 
playgrounds, tourist development. We 
did it”.  
In the contentious, fragile political space, 
aspiring locals, including politicians, saw this 
as an opportunity to ‘appropriate’ resources. 
NGOs did not initially understand these 
intentions: “We started contacting local 
politicians of the (then) Darjeeling Gorkha 
Hill Council, giving them critical feedback 
about the project to help them question 
the relevant dam authorities. Little did we 
know they would use this information to 
meet their own ‘special needs’” (Field data, 
2015). Under assurance of anonymity, one 
of the respondents explained how the local 
authorities: “took all the documents and… 
to put it bluntly, pressured the hydropower 
company and got a deal for themselves. 
Not for the people, but for themselves. To 
be very honest, that’s what happened” 
(Field data, 2015). It is clear then, why local 
Interviewer: “So when you became a 
political representative, the process 
[of building hydropower dams] was 
already ongoing?”
Respondent: “… actually what 
happened, you know, 51 households 
were having interviews [on 
compensation] – okay. But they were 
not getting the [promised] jobs and/
or the [promised] compensation”.
Interviewer: “They didn’t r ceive 
it”?
Respondent: “Yeah, but we fought 
it with the Rammam hydro-project, 
and we stopped [power] generation 
for almost two months”.
Interviewer: “How did you do that”?
Respondent: “All together, we went 
to the intake, blocked water flow, 
and gave a letter to the project 
manager. Because they are not 
issuing checks to the project-
affected, so we are doing this. We 
blocked the intake for two months 
and one day their manager came 
to our political office and agreed 
to provide eight lakhs [800,000 
rupees] per household... So, we 
allowed them [the proj c -affected 
people] to earn that (sic) [benefit]. 
It means… how much… almost four 
crores [four million rupees]. And 
they also gave us [local political 
representatives] three crores 
(three million) for surrounding 
developments; playgrounds, tourist 
development. We did it”.
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politicians and the more resourceful in local 
communities opposed NGOs raising their 
voice against some of these issues. Further, 
for residents of marginalized settlements 
this development – no matter how skewed 
– presented an opportunity unlike anything 
they had experienced before, or as one of 
the respondents put it: “near the dam site, 
a lot of money is pumped in a very short 
time. Not many locals can see that gains 
of employment are short-term” (Field data, 
2015). 
It was only when established civil-society 
groups from Delhi and elsewhere, who had 
experience of highlighting environmental 
and social injustices, supported local NGOs 
in their critique and contestation of large 
dams, that there was some coverage of 
these issues in national newspapers (e.g., 
The Economic Times; Indian Express). 
Nonetheless, this networking caused a 
serious backlash for local NGOs: local NGOs 
realized they were far more vulnerable to 
local political coercions than civil society 
actors from outside - who were here today 
and gone tomorrow. For local business 
and politics, the process of containing 
increasingly public protests would go on 
to become lucrative. A senior official in the 
local government confirmed that, “Some 
of the [political] leaders realized that they 
could coerce local communities and/or 
NGOs to either protest against the project 
or enable developers to go ahead with the 
construction. This tactic was useful in being 
continuously paid off by the company” (Field 
data, 2015). A local politician confirmed, 
“NHPC means a lot of money. To get some 
of their works done, illegally, or rather 
get it done smoothly, they pay their tax 
to local political parties, as party funds… 
That happens directly between NHPC and 
the senior leadership of the local ruling 
party” (Field data, 2015). Another local 
politician said, “Realistically speaking, I can’t 
imagine a situation in which someone would 
disagree with dams. From my experience, 
and I’m telling some real insider stuff here… 
one of the first concerns the current local 
party has – is collecting pay-offs from the 
dam projects”. Not only do they receive kick-
backs for ensuring that there is no trouble 
- preventing local protests - they also get 
contracts on dam projects… they are fully co-
opted; any question of them ever opposing 
the project on ecological or other issues 
would be academic” (Field data, 2015). 
Large sums of money exchanged hands 
through circuitous routes (developer 
to politicians to local leaders) - till the 
developers received the mandatory “No 
Objection Certificate/s (NOC)” (from local 
communities - a process that is mandatory 
for the EIA approval). While the Darjeeling 
politicians had no official say in dam 
development, they did have a distinct 
“nuisance value”. They could “raise public 
opinion against the dams, participate in 
public hearings and ask pointed questions 
pending approval” (Field data, 2015). And 
yet “bribed and bought over”, they often 
declared, “we have no rights to stop the 
project when the Government of India 
and the Government of West Bengal have 
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already signed an agreement with the 
developer” (Field data, 2015). NGOs were 
often on the short end of this process. 
As one NGO staff recalls, “For the TLPD III 
project, we had thoroughly prepared for 
questioning the NHPC at the public hearing. 
When the time for the hearing came, we 
were threatened by the local politicians to 
not attend the hearings at all. We were told, 
that if we were seen there, they (the political 
affiliates) would break our legs” (Field data, 
2015). Another NGO staff member recalls, 
“They wanted to kill me if I did not stop… 
because when you talk about dams there is 
lots of money involved… the companies give 
a lot of money to a lot of local politicians” 
(Field data, 2015). 
NGOs initially involved in questioning the 
manner in which hydropower development 
projects were implemented, were also 
questioned by the Indian government. 
One NGO which had actively protested 
against the two projects (TLDP III & IV) 
was summoned by the Ministry of Home. 
“Out of the blue, we were asked to come 
to Delhi with all our accounts and invoices 
dating back to when we started work and 
got registered as an NGO. Thankfully, we 
had stored all our paperwork. We took 
boxes of paperwork all the way to Delhi, 
there were so many boxes that it filled up 
an entire hotel room. Our meeting at the 
Home Office was chilling. Little was said, 
no explanations were given – it seemed we 
were being told indirectly to lie low” (Field 
data, 2015). Another NGO staff noted, 
“They [government] can always arm-twist 
you. They can always find something wrong 
with your work, there are ways to do this… 
In this case they might not find anything 
wrong with me for the thing that I’m doing, 
but they’ll find something wrong behind 
my back, and it’s not worth it” (Field data, 
2015).
Ironically, most NGOs blamed each other 
for the lack of solidarity and perseverance, 
“…we tried [questioning hydropower 
development projects], but you see every 
NGO in the NGO network, during the 
meeting - they say, “yes, yes” [and then] they 
go back to their day-to-day jobs” (Field data, 
2015) (for more responses bringing back this 
point please find below interview excerpts 
from the field data, 2015).  
“…other organizations here in Darjeeling 
are not involved in activism. Just get 
some fund for certain programs, they 
do whatever is going on… they are 
not concerned, nothing. Just a few 
organizations here, including us, are 
concerned [about the larger issues]” 
(Field data, 2015).  
 “The problem here is… al l  the 
organizations here… are all scams. 
All. Not 99.99%, 100% scams… That’s 
why things are going wrong here. And 
eventually they’ll be bought” (Field data, 
2015).  
Various coercions thus dissuaded local 
NGOs from challenging the decision to 
implement the dam projects, even though, 
most explain, “In your mind you know it’s 
“…other organizations here in 
Darjeeling are not involved in 
activism. Just get some fund for 
certain programs, they do whatever 
is going on… they are not concerned, 
nothing. Just a few organizations 
here, including us, are concerned 
[about the larger issues]” (Field 
data, 2015). 
“The problem here is… all the 
organizations here… are all scams. 
All. Not 99.99%, 100% scams… 
That’s why things are going wrong 
here. And eventually they’ll be 
bought” (Field data, 2015). 
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not good, it’s all wrong. But feeling that is 
one thing and openly saying that, taking a 
principal[ed], political stand, throws you 
into the political area. Many of us cannot do 
that” (Field data, 2015). This epitomizes how 
NGOs in general - subject to governmental 
regulation and political conditions - are 
entangled with the State and far from able 
to ‘keep the State accountable and effective’ 
(Lewis, 2002, p.571). Can civil society 
play any meaningful role at all, then, in a 
coercive political space? We focus on this 
issue in discussing resistance to hydropower 
projects in Dzongu, Sikkim by the Affected 
Citizens of Teesta (ACT). 
THE CASE OF THE AFFECTED 
CITIZENS OF TEESTA IN 
DZONGU, SIKKIM 
“I will die but won’t allow mega power 
projects in Dzongu” (activist Dawa Lepcha4).
Lepchas, known traditionally as the Mutanchi 
(Mother Nature’s People) or Rong Pa (People 
of the Ravine) are considered the first 
peoples of the region. This landscape known 
by the Lepchas as Mayel Lyang (Hidden 
Paradise) included Sikkim, Darjeeling and 
Kalimpong in the Eastern Himalayan belt 
and parts of Bhutan, Tibet and Nepal (West, 
2009; Tamsang, 2008). In the book, ‘Lepcha, 
My Vanishing Tribe’ Arthur Foning (1987), 
a Lepcha scholar from Kalimpong, voices 
fear that resonate widely in the Lepcha 
community – that geo-political, social and 
economic upheavals in the region have 
decimated the Lepchas, and inter- and intra-
national administrative boundaries have 
displaced and uprooted them, their culture 
and their way of life. Little (2010) notes that 
there are approximately 45,000 Lepchas in 
Sikkim and some 70,0000 outside the State. 
Foreseeing this marginalization, the last 
monarch of Sikkim had declared Dzongu, 
North Sikkim as a Lepcha reserve in 1956. 
Aside from the 7000 Lepchas living here, 
all others, including Lepchas from outside 
Dzongu and other Sikkimese nationals, 
are denied access to Dzongu without an 
official permit. Dzongu’s status as a Lepcha 
reservation was formally agreed in Sikkim’s 
1975 merger with India. These processes 
established Dzongu as the last bastion of the 
Lepchas, where they are not a minority and 
their culture, language and identity survive. 
This explains the resistance to the seven 
large hydropower dams planned in Dzongu, 
five inside Dzongu and two along its borders. 
The ‘Lepcha opposition’ to dams was led 
initially by a handful of Lepcha youths from 
Dzongu, who in time swelled in numbers 
and came to be known as the Affected 
Citizens of Teesta (ACT). ACT eventually 
managed to get four of the seven dams 
cancelled through a largely non-violent 
Gandhian pathway (Arora, 2006). This 
struggle between a displaced minority 
6 Quote taken from http://www.actsikkim.com/dzongu.html, November 25, 2018.
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against powerful official and development 
actors has been described as “a David and 
Goliath battle” (Little, 2010) and it is argued 
that the struggle was built on narratives of 
indigenous Lepcha identity and Dzongu’s 
cultural sanctity: “We (Lepchas) have been 
here for centuries, following our culture, 
tradition, language. And today, in the name 
of development, they are finishing it. Is this 
development? When you lose your identity, 
you are gone. Finished! So… in that sense, I 
think Lepchas, especially in Dzongu… I think 
it is a sort of a design to finish us” (Mayel 
Lyang Development Board Chairperson, 
in Interview, Kalimpong, 2015). And yet, 
as Gergan (2014, pp.70,72) notes, before 
hydropower projects planned in Dzongu 
propelled the reserve ‘into the center of 
controversy’, Dzongu, was for all practical 
purposes, ‘a landscape of precarity… 
[where] remoteness, isolation and poor 
infrastructure profoundly shaped everyday 
experiences’. We discuss below how the 
proponents of the ACT movement, a few 
protesting youths were not only challenging 
the development of hydropower projects 
in Dzongu, but they were questioning the 
deeply consensual politics of development 
in Sikkim in which the Lepcha elites 
from within and outside of Dzongu were 
themselves, key stakeholders.   
THE ACT DEVELOPMENT OF 
DISSENT
For the ACT members, contestations against 
dams in Dzongu was not about negotiating 
compensation or relocation. Their focus was 
clear, “we don’t want to lose [the last bastion 
of] our Mayel Lyang (hidden paradise); if it 
is desecrated then our culture becomes 
extinct!” (ACT ideologue, Athup Lepcha, 
reported in Arora, 2006). Lepcha members 
and supporters of the movement expressed 
that it was hypocritical to say no to dams 
and still use electricity. However, their 
argument was that Dzongu - the protected 
Lepcha reserve – was ill-suited to such large-
scale development. Some even added that 
perhaps large hydropower projects were 
more suited to “other areas, where people 
were more educated, able to take care of 
themselves, and … the carrying capacity 
is better than [here]… an environmentally 
fragile and demographically endangered 
place” (ACT supporter in Gangtok). While 
the average ACT supporter was relatively 
indifferent to hydropower development in 
areas not affecting Dzongu, a resounding 
88.3 percent of the same respondents were 
against it in Dzongu; 47.7 percent “strongly 
opposed” dams in Dzongu (Field Research, 
2015). 
ACT members drew attention to ‘the State’s 
double standards’: bestowing protected 
status on Dzongu, and then violating its 
own assertion by ‘plans to take away the 
very land and indigenous culture of the 
people it claims to be protecting’ (Dawa 
Lepcha, reported in Arora, 2006). Such 
critique of coercion in governance was 
unheard of in Sikkim, where successive 
elected governments have long established 
patron-client dependence among an 
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ethnically divided constituency (Huber 
and Joshi, 2015). In this context, the 
‘rejecting of the way things are…’ was 
unprecedented (Li, 2007). There were far-
reaching repercussions of this “practice of 
politics” (ibid). In sum, it questioned the 
nurtured image of Sikkim as India’s green 
democracy. 
In Darjeeling, NGOs had relied on local 
politicians, providing them relevant 
information, believing their promises to 
act on the people’s behalf and against 
the West Bengal Government and dam 
developers). These politicians often used 
the information to secure material gains 
from the developers, choosing to not speak 
on behalf of the people as explained in the 
previous section. In contrast, the ACT’s 
very first act of public resistance was to 
challenge the fact that 80 per cent of the 
audience at the public hearing for the Teesta 
Stage III project in Chungthang (which 
borders Dzongu) were state administrative 
officials, politicians, dam developers and 
pro-dam residents, at an event meant to 
enable local community to review and 
decide on the EIA (Wangchuk, 2007). The 
‘ACT members saw [this disproportion] as 
engineered to intimidate dissent’ (ibid; 35). 
When the EIA for this particular dam was 
declared as approved, the protesting ACT 
activists did not accept defeat. Unfunded, 
they filed a legal case ‘in the National 
Environmental Appellate Authority in New 
Delhi against the public hearing and its 
verdict’ (ibid). When this failed as well, 
ACT activists physically blocked roads into 
Chungthang, preventing district officials 
and dam developers from surveying land 
needed for another hydropower project, 
Panan, located in Dzongu. These inspections 
eventually required police escort and 
detention restrictions to hold back the 
activists. Even though 74 of the 99 Dzongu 
Lepcha households, whose lands were to 
be acquired for the project, provided ‘No 
Objection (to the dam project) Certificates’ 
to the concerned authorities, ACT protests 
eventually led to canceling the Panan 
project. Eventually, the ACT activists moved 
their protests from Dzongu to the state 
capital, Gangtok, where peaceful collective 
protests and marathon rounds of fasting 
totaling 915 days (2007-2010) drew public 
attention to the patronage politics and 
authoritative coercion in the Sikkim that 
undermined citizen voice (Huber and 
Joshi, 2015). Multiple tactics of consensual 
governance - promising development 
benefits to the faithful, to activists who 
withdrew their support, and the punishing 
of those who refused to yield failed to 
contain ACT members (ibid). Eventually, 4 
of the 5 dams planned inside Dzongu were 
cancelled, but, much more importantly, 
the movement exposed the structure 
and culture of coercive governance and 
the rhetoric of democracy in Sikkim. The 
exercise of people powers tremendously 
inspired a new wave of citizen voice and 
choice. A Lepcha supporter of ACT from 
Darjeeling noted, “Government will never 
make [people aware]. NGOs will not do that. 
It is the Lepchas themselves who have to do 
this. We did it” (Field data, 2015).  
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McDuie-Ra’s (2011, p.89) analysis of pro-
dam actors is one of the rare accounts 
of how many Lepchas in Dzongu, were 
against the ACT, even ‘pressur[ing] the 
State to accelerate the projects’. Wangchuk 
(2007, p.42) notes how during the peak of 
ACT’s protests in Gangtok in 2007, ‘86 of 
the 90-odd Panan hydro-electric power 
project-affected families gave the Dzongu 
representative in the State Legislative 
Assembly a memorandum clarifying that 
they were not part of the ACT protest and 
reiterating that the No Objection Certificates 
issued by them for the project still held good 
if their demands for better compensation 
rates and other safeguards were granted’. 
McDuie-Ra (2008, p.89) further notes that 
pro-dam actors were predominantly elite 
Lepchas of Dzongu, ‘a network of NGOs 
[doing development], political leaders 
and public servants with some ties with 
larger Lepcha organizations in Gangtok’. 
Gergan (2014, p.67) has argued ‘that the 
anti-dam protests became a way for the 
Dzongu youth to question [not just] State 
development agendas [but equally Lepcha] 
elders and urban elite’ who claimed to speak 
on behalf of the community. Gergan (ibid, 
p.68) argues that beyond the stories of a 
blissful “hidden paradise” (Mayel Lyang) 
ACT used the ‘contradictory experience of 
everyday hardships’ in Dzongu to expose 
‘the community’s skewed dependence on 
Government and exclusionary practices’ of 
governance through coercion. These young 
people emerged in 2007 as “alchemists of 
the revolution”, questioning, challenging 
and reimagining Dzongu’s future, as well as 
their own (ibid).  
The complex struggle inter-weaving 
the personal and the political, rhetoric 
and reality of indigeneity, and varying 
perceptions of place, identity and citizenship 
in Dzongu is difficult to summarize. Simply 
stated, one unique outcome was a synergy 
of voices, questioning the rhetoric of 
State ‘development’ agendas, State-elite 
entanglements, society and class, and 
other fractures in an otherwise close-knit 
community. Unfettered by external and 
internal compulsions, the ACT enabled a 
loose group of diverse actors and agencies 
‘to hold the State accountable’ (Lewis, 2002, 
p.571) and ‘enable citizen control of public 
life’ across institutional hierarchies (Cox, 
1999, p.27). This strongly contrasts with 
what NGOs in Darjeeling did or did not do.  
CONCLUSION
Our research analyzed diverse civil 
society organizations and their nature of 
engagement with dam development in the 
Eastern Himalaya regions of Sikkim and 
Darjeeling. Our findings show that although 
both NGOs and people’s movements 
imagine and perceive large dams in very 
similar ways, they have responded to these 
developments in significantly different 
ways. This difference in positioning is 
largely explained by the State-NGO 
interrelations. Partnerships between the 
State and civil society – considered so 
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important in development - are often 
unequal and limiting. When these terms and 
conditions set the context of dialogue, one 
cannot expect possibilities for meaningful 
engagement. In this case, dams were framed 
as necessary for national development. 
Other possibilities for development were 
politically off the table. The State is not a 
“homogeneous medium, separated from 
civil society by a ditch, but an uneven set 
of branches and functions, only relatively 
integrated by the hegemonic practices 
which take place within it” (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985 in Mohan, 2002, p.133). This 
narrowing of distance between the State 
and civil society is a key contributing factor 
in the narrowing of possibilities for political 
actions and reassertions (Mohan, 2002). 
Through our findings, we draw attention to 
the processes through which such unequal 
partnerships between the State, markets, 
civil society, and local communities are 
increasingly promoted in the neoliberal 
agenda of development. Mohan (ibid, 2007) 
describes this rhetoric of partnership as ‘one 
of consensus rather than conflict in that all 
actors should negotiate a “shared vision” of 
national development’. 
Social movements are often formulated in 
different ways to NGOs. In this case, the ACT 
resistance was framed around a cultural 
context, that dams would negatively affect 
indigenous communities, their lands, and 
ways of life. In this case, not only was the 
movement independent of the State (in 
terms of funding, regulations etc.), the State 
also had no tools, no strategies to respond 
to these relational aspects of the impacts of 
development. We argue here that this space 
in which social movements can articulate 
and foreground discursive alternatives to 
neo-liberal paradigms of development are 
particularly strategic, perhaps far more than 
issues of displacement and rehabilitation - 
which are methods that the state outlines 
for compensating for development-induced 
material losses. Here, Gramsci’s ideas 
of civil society creating and claiming a 
space for political agency, for harnessing 
countervailing power against the state 
excesses (in whatever form imagined by civil 
society), is a lesson that emerges.
Our research highlights that NGOs in 
Darjeeling are entangled in the “service 
delivery paradigm”, bound by ‘financial logic 
and challenging local circumstances’ unable 
to address the civil-society goal of political 
transformation (Rahman, 2006, pp.451-
453). Initially, large dam development in 
Darjeeling inspired some local NGOs to 
‘return to politics’ (Banks et al., 2015, p.715) 
as opposed to having a service delivery 
focus, but these initiatives were short-lived, 
partly because of the context in which they 
exist and operate. As Partha Chatterjee 
(2004; pp.4,46) notes, spatial politics 
segregates Indian civil society enable a 
‘bourgeois society, inhabited by a relatively 
small section of the people… a closed 
association of modern elite groups, [to be] 
sequestered from the wider popular life of 
[far-flung] communities, walled up within 
enclaves of civic freedom and rational law’. 
In Darjeeling, civic freedoms have long been 
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missing (Joshi, 2015), although precisely 
therefore they should re-emerge. Our 
research does not negate NGOs’ potential 
as a third pillar next to the market and the 
State, but rather illuminates the need for 
revisioning their political potential. 
As things stand, NGOs in Darjeeling operate 
in a context where political power operates 
rationally through rather than for civil 
society (Sending and Newmann, 2006). 
In general, NGOs embroiled in doing 
development are both object and subject 
of the state (Sending and Newmann 2006; 
Bryant, 2002; Rose et al., 2006; Rose and 
Miller, 1992). NGOs in the Darjeeling 
region can do little else but collaborate in 
this web of governance, legitimizing this 
governmentality. The absence of a functional 
democracy in Darjeeling impacts the lack of 
civil society in Darjeeling and this vicious 
cycle persists. In such a skewed political 
terrain, hydropower development or any 
other form of trans-local coercion requires 
no more than a façade of participation. What 
we researched and discussed in Darjeeling 
mirrors the nature and circumstances in 
which hydropower projects are being rolled 
out in seemingly contentious regions around 
the world: elsewhere in India’s North-East, 
but also in the neighboring Mekong Basin. 
In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(Lao PDR), the rush to develop hydropower 
happens where historically there has been 
no culture of participation (Grumbine 
and Xu, 2011; Matthews and Dotta, 2015; 
Goldman, 2001); where civil society is 
either absent, heavily restricted and/or 
criminalized (Matthews and Schmidt, 2014). 
To conclude, challenging the consensual 
politics of eco-governmentality requires a 
greater solidarity between different civil 
society actors and agencies - but this is 
easier said than done. What remains of 
a dammed Teesta river flows far beyond 
the divided administrative borders of the 
States of Sikkim and West Bengal - well into 
Bangladesh. And yet, even between Sikkim 
and Darjeeling in West Bengal, politico-
administrative arrangements, ethnic-
fractures and local politics continue to 
divide, rather than unite, local communities 
and civil society. However, as our findings 
note, governance is on the ‘move’ in that 
relationships between the State and civil 
society are not static nor predictable. It is 
this fluidity that we identify as a potentially 
attractive space for diverse coalitions to 
emerge among different civil society groups 
and actors to take better control of public 
life.
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